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The	 United	 Kingdom	 has	 long	 engaged	 in	 covert	 action.	 It	 continues	 to	 do	 so	
today.	 Owing	 to	 the	 secrecy	 involved,	 however,	 such	 activity	 has	 consistently	
been	 excluded	 from	 debates	 about	 Britain’s	 global	 role,	 foreign	 and	 security	
policy,	 and	military	 planning:	 an	 important	 lacuna	 given	 the	 controversy,	 risk,	
appeal,	and	 frequency	of	 covert	action.	Examining	when,	how,	and	why	covert	
action	is	used,	this	article	argues	that	contemporary	covert	action	has	emerged	
from,	and	 is	 shaped	by,	a	 specific	 context.	 First,	a	gap	exists	between	Britain’s	
perceived	 global	 responsibilities	 and	 its	 actual	 capabilities;	 policy	 elites	 see	
covert	 action	 as	 able	 to	 resolve,	 or	 at	 least	 conceal,	 this.	 Second,	 intelligence	
agencies	 can	 shape	 events	 proactively,	 especially	 at	 the	 tactical	 level,	 whilst	
flexible	 preventative	 operations	 are	 deemed	 well-suited	 to	 the	 range	 of	 fluid	
threats	currently	faced.	Third,	existing	Whitehall	machinery	makes	covert	action	
viable.	However,	current	covert	action	is	smaller	scale	and	less	provocative	today	
than	 in	 the	early	Cold	War;	 it	 revolves	around	“disruption”	operations.	Despite	








non-state	 actor	 in	 a	 detectable	 but	 plausibly	 deniable	 manner.	 The	 late	 1940s	 saw	
operations	 to	 “liberate”	Albania.	 In	 the	 1950s,	 attention	 turned	 to	 ambitious	 attempts	 at	
regime	change	in	Iran,	Egypt	and	Syria.	Over	the	following	decade,	covert	action	extended	
to	 supporting	 rebels	 in	 the	 Yemeni	 civil	 war	 and	 disrupting	 Indonesian	 forces	 during	
Confrontation.	The	1970s	 saw	a	 slight	dip	but	did	 include	covert	action	closer	 to	home	 in	
Northern	 Ireland	 –	 as	 well	 as	 a	 continuation	 on	 distant	 shores,	 this	 time	 intervening	 in	
Oman.	 Under	 Margaret	 Thatcher	 in	 the	 1980s,	 covert	 action	 increased	 with	 operations	
supporting	the	Afghan	Mujahedeen	against	the	Soviets.	Another	dip	occurred	in	the	1990s,	
but	 the	 Secret	 Intelligence	 Service	 (SIS,	 or	more	 commonly	 known	 as	MI6)	 still	 sought	 to	






Gadaffi	 during	 the	 Libyan	 civil	war,	 operations	 to	 disrupt	 the	 Iranian	 nuclear	 programme,	
cyber	 operations	 against	 terrorists	 and	 organised	 criminals,	 and	 efforts	 to	 discredit	




and	was	 keen	 to	 use	 them	 in	 Algeria	 and	Mali	 too.	 Through	 official	 documents,	 whistle-
blowers,	press	 reports,	 and	 interviews	–	and	a	 rigorous	methodological	process	of	 source	
triangulation	 –	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 move	 beyond	 the	 realms	 of	 speculation	 and	 uncover	 a	
surprising	amount	of	detail	on	such	activity.		
Nonetheless,	 scholarship	 on	 covert	 action	 inevitably	 suffers,	 owing	 to	 intense	












among	 the	more	 tangible	 and	 dramatic	 forms	 of	 deniable	 interventionism.	However,	 this	








does	 discuss	 covert	 propaganda,	 technical,	 and	 influence	 operations	 in	 detail	 where	
possible.	However,	this	should	not	be	taken	to	imply	that	Special	Forces	activity	necessarily	
outweighs	less	tangible	operations.	
Interrogating	when,	 how,	 and	why	 Britain	 has	 used	 covert	 action	 since	 2010,	 this	





the	United	Kingdom	seeks	to	maintain	a	global	 role	–	a	powerful	 idea	 long	driving	 foreign	
policy	 –	 but	 is	 constrained	by	 economic,	military,	 and	 political	 factors.	 This	 creates	 a	 gap	




resolving	 this	 divide	 between	 ideational	 constructions	 of	 the	 global	 role	 and	 the	material	
reality	of	decline.	As	constraints	 increase,	 the	disconnect	 remains	 in	place	 today	–	 leaving	
covert	 action	 an	 appealing	 option.	 However,	with	 the	 (rare)	 exception	 of	 the	 Intelligence	
and	 Security	 Committee,	 senior	 politicians	 do	 not	 publicly	 refer	 to	 covert	 action.	 By	
identifying	and	unpacking	their	language,	and	the	assumptions	therein,	discourse	analysis	of	
statements	 and	 documents	 can	 be	 useful	 in	 demonstrating	 this	 appeal.	 Key	 language,	 or	








planning.	 Third,	 the	 domestic	 bureaucratic	 environment	 is	 conducive	 to	 covert	 action:	
legislation	 permits	 such	 activity;	 fora	 exist	 to	 task	 and	 coordinate	 covert	 action;	 whilst	





Importantly,	 it	argues	 that	 contemporary	 trends	 in	covert	action	consist	of	 smaller	
scale,	 tactical,	 and	disruptive	operations.	Available	evidence	suggests	 that	 covert	action	 is	
not	 seeing	 a	 return	 to	 ambitious	 coups	 and	 regime	 change	 activity	 which,	 as	 a	 point	 of	
comparison,	 existed	 during	 the	 early	 Cold	 War	 and	 the	 era	 of	 decolonisation.	 British	
involvement	 in	 attempts	 (some	 more	 successful	 than	 others)	 to	 install	 new	 leaders	 in	
Albania,	 Iran,	 Egypt,	 Syria,	 Indonesia,	 and	 Oman	 is	 a	 thing	 of	 the	 past.	 In	 fact,	 sceptics	
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believe	 that	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 provides	 a	 less	 permissive	 environment	 for	 covert	
action	 altogether	 than	 during	 the	 Cold	War.
8
	 This	 article	 challenges	 such	 assumptions	 by	
arguing	 that,	 whilst	 the	 current	 environment	 may	 be	 less	 permissive	 for	 ambitious	
operations,	 it	 is	actually	more	permissive	 for	disruption	and	“fixing”.	This	article	contends	
that,	 rightly	 or	 wrongly,	 policymakers	 are	 turning	 to	 the	 covert	 toolkit,	 especially	 at	 the	
tactical	 level,	 to	 meet	 contemporary	 security	 challenges.
9
	 Indeed,	 rather	 than	 taking	 a	
normative	stance	by	critiquing	the	effectiveness	or	legitimacy	of	covert	action	in	detail,	this	
article	 seeks	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 “a	 missing	 dimension”	 of	 British	 policy	 and	 explain	 its	
contemporary	appeal	 sometimes	 regardless	of	debates	over	operational	efficacy	 (which	 is	
notoriously	difficult	to	judge)	altogether.	
Perhaps	 unsurprisingly	 given	 the	 surrounding	 secrecy,	 current	 debates	 about	
Britain’s	foreign	and	defence	policy	have	consistently	overlooked	the	issue	of	covert	action.	
This	is	important;	for	it	means	that	an	often	controversial	means	of	interventionism	is	going	




	 that	 the	 defence	 community	 is	 moving	 towards	
“jointery”	and	 integrated	 full-spectrum	capabilities,
11
	 and	 that	 the	2010	Strategic	Defence	
and	Security	Review	(SDSR)	amounted	to	a	missed	opportunity	to	offer	a	coherent	approach	
bringing	 ‘together	 ends,	 ways,	 and	 means.’
12
	 However,	 the	 literature	 stops	 short	 of	











Special	 Forces	 have	 attracted	 some	 academic	 attention;	 with	 scholars	 recognising	




been	 either	 from	 a	 specifically	 American	 perspective	 (which	 separates	 military	 special	
operations	 from	 covert	 action),
16
	 or	 from	 a	 strategic	 studies	 perspective	 (which	 isolates	
Special	Forces	from	intelligence,	examining	them	instead	in	relation	to	conventional	forces,	







Building	 on	 such	 recent	 scholarship,	 this	 article	 adopts	 a	 holistic	 approach	 by	
considering	the	role	of	Special	Forces	and	intelligence	together	and	arguing	that	such	fusion,	
consistent	with	British	understandings	of	covert	action,	is	seen	by	elites	as	a	useful	means	of	




















official	 British	 definition	 exists.	 The	 only	 one	 accessible	 is	 that	 used	 by	 the	 military:	
operations	 ‘which	 are	 so	 planned	 and	 executed	 as	 to	 conceal	 the	 identity	 of,	 or	 permit	
plausible	denial	by,	the	sponsor.	They	differ	from	clandestine	operations	in	that	emphasis	is	




	The	 closest	 Britain	 has	 to	 an	 American-style	 “such	 other	 functions	 and	 duties”	
statement	 is	 found	 in	the	1994	 Intelligence	Services	Act,	which	placed	SIS	and	GCHQ	on	a	
statutory	 footing.	 It	 permitted	 SIS	 to	 engage	 in	 ‘other	 tasks’	 outside	 of	 obtaining	
information.	 Unfortunately	 however,	 the	 UK	 lacks	 a	 clear	 conceptual	 framework	 beyond	
this.	 Since	 the	 Second	World	War,	Whitehall’s	 terminology	 has	 variously	 included	 special	




discourse	 include	 disrupt,	 influence,	 prevent,	 shape,	 and	 discredit:	 i.e.	 when	 intelligence	
agencies	affect	change	themselves.	Tactics	for	deniable	interventionism	are	many;	and	this	
article	considers	them	together.	Generally	speaking,	the	British	have	long	thought	of	covert	
action	 in	 two	 categories:	 propaganda	 (including	 both	 grey	 and	 black)
23
	 and	 operations	











Ministry	 of	 Defence	 (which	 oversaw	 both	 Special	 Forces	 and	 deception)	 involvement	 in	
covert	activity.	Indeed,	since	the	late	1950s,	covert	action	has	seen	closer	relations	between	
the	military	and	SIS.	This,	as	we	shall	see,	is	still	felt	keenly	today.		





	By	 contrast,	 the	UK	context,	which	 is	 free	 from	









through	 covert	 action	 by	 special	 units.’
28
	 Combined	with	 recent	moves	 towards	 fusion	 of	
intelligence	 and	 Special	 Forces	 capabilities,
29
	 this	 article	 therefore	 considers	 both	 covert	
action	and	Special	 Forces	 together.	Whilst	 acknowledging	 the	 conceptual	differences,	 it	 is	
















role	 in	 the	world;	 that's	 not	 the	 case.’
31
	 In	 2014,	 90	 per	 cent	 of	Members	 of	 Parliament	
approvingly	 agreed	 that	 Britain	 punches	 above	 its	 weight	 globally,
32
	 whilst	 the	 2010	











global	 role	 largely	 manifests	 itself	 in	 an	 ability	 to	 maintain	 international	 order,	 project	
influence,	and	promote	British	values	overseas.	The	role	is	not	lost	on	key	allies.	American	
government	officials	have	implored	the	UK	to	continue	its	global	role.	In	2015,	for	example,	








to	 maintain	 a	 global	 role	 is	 severely	 hampered	 by	 various	 constraints,	 creating	 a	 gap	

















The	 2015	 autumn	 spending	 review	 involved	 a	 better-than-expected	 outcome	 for	 the	
Ministry	of	Defence,	but	by	this	point	austerity	had	had	a	severe	impact.	As	a	result	of	five	
years	of	cuts,	the	House	of	Commons	Defence	Select	Committee	concluded	that	Cameron’s	
government	 had	 halved	 Britain’s	 fighting	 power	 since	 2010.
42
	 Similar	 problems	 have	




At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 post	 9/11	 environment	 has	made	 assertive,	 confident,	 and	
overt	interventionism	much	more	difficult.	As	the	Chief	of	the	Defence	Staff	argues,	‘there	is	

























antipathy	 has	 developed	 alongside	 greater	 public	 cynicism	 towards	 politicians.	 In	 March	




whether	 Britain	 should	 take	 military	 action.
51
	 Moreover,	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 public	 now	
believe	 that	 the	 UK	 should	 only	 take	 military	 action	 if	 the	 House	 of	 Commons	 votes	 to	
support	 it	 and	 politicians	 are	 ever	 less	 inclined	 to	 ignore	 public	 opinion	 ‘after	 the	 Iraq	
experience	 weighed	 so	 heavily	 on	 the	 legacy	 of	 Tony	 Blair’.
52
	 All	 of	 this	 creates	 a	 sharp	
constraint	 on	 overt	 interventionism	 as	 a	 means	 to	 maintain	 global	 influence,	 as	
demonstrated	by	Cameron’s	decision,	in	November	2015	before	the	Paris	terrorist	attacks,	




Driven	 by	 the	 idea	 of	 Britain	 as	 a	world	 power,	 political	 elites	 desire	 a	 global	 role	
with	 global	 responsibilities.	 However,	 economic,	 military,	 and	 political	 factors	 seriously	
constrain	 traditional	 interventionism.	This	creates	a	gap	between	 ideational	construct	and	
material	 reality;	 between	 perceived	 responsibilities	 and	 actual	 capabilities.	 The	
responsibility/capability	 disconnect	 has	 not	 gone	 unnoticed.	 In	 2014,	 the	 parliamentary	
Joint	 Committee	 on	 the	 National	 Security	 Strategy	 expressed	 scepticism	 that	 the	 central	
aim,	 to	maintain	a	global	 role,	 could	be	achieved	 in	 light	of	 spending	cuts.	 It	warned	 that	






Forces	 to	 shape	 events	 and	 perpetuate	 the	 global	 role	 idea	 though	 smoke,	 mirrors,	 and	
























It	 can	 also	 be	 a	 force	 multiplier	 allowing	 the	 execution	 of	 policy	 using	 fewer	 resources,	
fewer	 “boots	 on	 the	 ground”,	 and	 with	 fewer	 casualties.	 That	 the	 current	 government	
believes	 this	 is	 demonstrated	 in	 two	 ways.	 First,	 despite	 deep	 cuts	 elsewhere,	 both	




stated	 that	 British	 policy	 responses	 must	 adapt	 ‘as	 the	 nature	 of	 war,	 espionage	 and	
terrorism	 changes’,	 and	 that	 increased	 funding	 will	 allow	 intelligence	 to	 ‘help	 disrupt	
terrorist	 plots’.
61
	 For	 example,	 as	 discussed	 in	 detail	 below,	 GCHQ,	 one	 of	 the	 main	
beneficiaries	 of	 increased	 funding,	 has	 established	 a	 programme	 to	 do	 just	 that.	 Second,	
demonstrating	 force	multiplication,	 the	2015	SDSR	explicitly	 argued	 that	 agile	 intelligence	
and	 Special	 Forces	 actors	 allow	Britain	 to	 ‘project	 our	 power	 globally’	 to	 help	 secure	 the	
‘vision’	 of	 worldwide	 influence.
62
	 With	 neither	 Osborne	 nor	 the	 SDSR	 willing	 or	 able	 to	
explicitly	 refer	 to	 covert	action,	both	cases	offer	 textual	markers	alluding	 to	covert	action	
which,	 in	 times	of	 austerity,	 offers	 an	 apparently	 cost-effective	means	of	 playing	 a	 global	

















an	 instrument	 of	 national	 power	 and	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘investing	 in	 greater	
numbers	of	Special	 Forces’	as	well	 as	using	proxies.
66
	 This	has	been	put	 into	practice.	 For	
example,	attempting	to	bypass	the	problems	of	using	conventional	force	to	defeat	non-state	
actors	 and	 operating	 in	 more	 than	 one	 battlefield	 simultaneously,	 Cameron	 despatched	




That	 is	not	 to	 say	 that	 covert	action	 is	a	 suitable	alternative	 to	 large	 scale	military	
intervention.	 Given	 military	 constraints,	 policymakers	 are	 increasingly	 keen	 merely	 to	
manage	uncertainty,	disorder,	and	insecurity.	States,	according	to	Christopher	Coker,	prefer	
to	 ‘patch	up,	 shore	up	or	underpin’	using	 ‘a	 series	of	 short-term	measures.’
68
	 Indeed,	 the	
‘tectonic	 shifts	 in	 world	 politics’	 faced	 by	 the	 British	 government,	 particularly	 the	 Arab	













Politically	 too,	 covert	 action	 provides	 an	 apparently	 convenient	 means	 of	







	 only	 a	 third	 of	 the	 public	 believe	 the	 use	 of	 Special	 Forces	 requires	
parliamentary	approval;
73




the	 government	backed	away	 from	parliamentary	 votes	on	 the	use	of	 force	 in	Vietnam	–	
and	relied	on	covert	support	for	the	Americans	 instead.	Following	suit,	Cameron	evaded	a	
vote	 on	 ISIS	 in	 Syria	 until	 after	 the	 2015	 Paris	 attacks,	 but,	 according	 to	 the	 American	
National	Security	Agency,	all	the	while	looked	‘to	the	UK	security	and	intelligence	agencies	











to	 ‘enhance	 the	 vital	 intelligence	 contribution	 to	 the	bilateral	 relationship’	 and	prioritised	
‘focus	on	areas	of	comparative	national	advantage	valued	by	key	allies,	especially	the	United	






alliance,	 and,	 just	 as	 Harold	Macmillan	 attempted	 in	 the	 late	 1950s,	 drive	 an	 element	 of	
interdependence	into	the	relationship.	











see	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 often	 involving	 disruption	 operations.	 Indeed,	 the	 2015	 SDSR	
strongly	emphasised	the	preventative	and	disruptive	role	of	intelligence	and	Special	Forces	
throughout,	 placing	 it,	 as	 a	 force	 multiplier,	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 British	 thinking.	 Having	
established	the	 ideational	appeal	or	motivation,	 this	article	will	now	demonstrate	the	role	





Intelligence	 actors,	 alongside	 Special	 Forces,	 attempt	 to	 fix	 or	 disrupt	 potential	 threats.	
Scholars,	 such	 as	Alastair	 Finlan,	 have	 long	 argued	 that	 changes	 in	 both	 the	 international	
environment	 and	 the	 British	 defence	 community	 have	made	 the	 future	 bright	 for	 Special	
Forces,	 and	 that	 they	will	 ‘continue	 to	 be	 the	 “force	of	 choice”	 for	 swift	 and	unorthodox	
state	 responses	 to	 perceived	 threats.’
80











they	 are	 faced.	 Both	 have	 caused	 a	 preference	 for	 pragmatic	 and	preventative	 disruptive	
action	designed	to	counter	threats	and	manage	uncertainty	at	source	–	before	they	escalate	
into	a	serious	problem.	Indeed,	the	security	establishment	has	long	recognised	the	dangers	
of	 insecurity	 and	 risk,	 often	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 a	 ‘unified,	 hegemonic	 national	 interest’.
82
	








footprint,	 obviates	 the	 burdens	 of	 victory,	 and	 disrupts	 hostile	 groups	 before	 they	 can	
attack.	 Like	 any	 means	 of	 policy	 execution,	 covert	 action	 also	 has	 limitations	 (both	





policy	 debates	 because	 of	 secrecy.	 In	 fact,	 SIS	 has	 increasingly	 engaged	 in	 disruptive	
activities	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	War,
86







the	 long-held	 role	 of	 Special	 Forces	 in	 flexible	 and	 direct	 action,
89
	 the	 Special	 Forces	
community	 has	 recently	 undergone	 a	 transformation	 towards	 flatter	 organisational	
17	
	
structures,	 towards	 influence	 (or	 less	 kinetic)	 operations,	 and,	 crucially,	 towards	 closer	
relations	 with	 intelligence	 actors.
90
	 This	 has	 been	 clearly	 demonstrated	 by	 recent	
organisational	reforms.	In	2007,	E	squadron	was	established	as	a	composite	force	of	Special	
Air	Service,	Special	Boat	Service	and	Special	Reconnaissance	Regiment	personnel	operating	
at	 the	 disposal	 of	 SIS	 and	 the	 Director	 of	 Special	 Forces.
91
	More	 recently,	 the	 Treasury’s	
2015	 Spending	 Review	 emphasised	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘fusing’	 intelligence	 with	 military	
actors	 to	 ‘disrupt’	 global	 threats,
92









continued	 existence	 of	 a	 security	 environment	 that	 is	 dominated	 by	 irregular	 threats,	
transnational	 networks	 and	 sub-state	 groups.’
95
	 For	 example,	 Cameron	 has	 sanctioned	 a	
new	 ‘proactive’	 Special	 Forces	 approach	 to	 ISIS,	 apparently	 giving	 Special	 Forces	 ‘carte	
blanche’	 to	 launch	 raids	 inside	 Syria	 and	 Iraq,
96
	 alongside	 sending	 the	 SAS	 (and	 likely	 the	
SBS)	 to	 Libya	 to	 disrupt	 and	 prevent	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	 ISIS	 headquarters	 there.
97
	
Alongside	 broader	 recognition	 of	 the	 disruptive	 role,	 the	 2015	 SDSR	 made	 it	 clear	 that	
Special	 Forces	 will	 ‘act	 decisively’	 where	 appropriate.
98








defined	 as:	 ‘Accessing	 the	 networks	 or	 systems	 of	 others	 to	 hamper	 their	 activities	 or	
18	
	







possible	 to	 give	 clear	 examples:	 GCHQ	 has	 significantly	 disrupted	 Taleban	 operations	 in	
Afghanistan	 by	 blitzing	mobile	 phones	 with	 text	messages	 and	 calls	 every	 10	 seconds.
102
	
Current	 disruption	 and	 technical	 sabotage	 techniques	 also	 involve	 sending	 viruses	 and	
Denial	 of	 Service	 attacks	 (known	 as	 ROLLING	 THUNDER	 and	 PREDATORS	 FACE),	 whilst	
ANGRY	PIRATE	is	‘a	tool	that	will	permanently	disable	a	target’s	account	on	their	computer’.	





GCHQ	 also	 engages	 in	 influence	 operations	 to	 disrupt	 and	 discredit	 targets.	 Policy	
elites	see	these	as	important:	the	ISC	requested	more	‘information	operations’	–	especially	
in	 the	 cyber	 realm;
104
	 the	Ministry	 of	 Defence	 recognises	 that	 ‘success	 in	 future	 conflict,	






	 Emphasising	 the	need	 to	win	 the	battle	 for	 ideology,	
David	Cameron	has	compared	the	fight	against	 ISIS	to	the	Cold	War,	 itself	a	high	point	for	















is	 limited	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 clear	 message,
110





GCHQ,	however,	can	discredit	a	 target	more	covertly.	For	example,	 it	 recommends	
‘writing	 a	 blog	 purporting	 to	 be	 one	 of	 their	 victims.’	 Another	 capability,	 codenamed	
CHANGELING,	 involves	 the	 ‘ability	 to	 spoof	 any	 email	 address	 and	 send	 email	 under	 that	
identity’.	GCHQ	can	also	change	a	 target’s	photos	on	a	 social	networking	 site	–	a	move	 it	
boasts	‘can	take	“paranoia”	to	a	whole	new	level.’	Other	ways	GCHQ	can	manipulate	targets	
in	order	to	disrupt	or	discredit	include	the	‘ability	to	artificially	increase	traffic	to	a	website’	







Driven	 by	 the	 need	 for	 preventative	 action	 (or	 the	 ‘active	 management’	 of	 risk),	
disruption	extends	beyond	counter-terrorism	to	other	contemporary	threats	too.	As	Richard	
Aldrich	argues,	a	globalised	world	has	 forced	governments	 to	 ‘place	 their	 intelligence	and	
security	 services	 in	 the	 front	 line	 against	 a	 range	 of	 elusive	 but	 troublesome	opponents,’	
again	 leading	 to	 a	 proactive	 intelligence	 community.
114
	 The	 proliferation	 of	 WMD,	 for	
example,	 requires	 preventative	 disruption,	 alongside	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 counter-
proliferation	 measures	 including	 law	 enforcement	 and	 multilateral	 activity.	 SIS	 has	 had	
success	 at	 this.	 John	 Sawers,	 its	 former	 Chief,	 admitted	 that	 SIS	 ran	 a	 series	 of	 covert	
operations	 to	 ‘slow	 down’	 Iranian	 development.
115










has	 tasked	 intelligence	 personnel	 with	 disrupting	 human	 trafficking	 networks	 in	 the	
Mediterranean.
118






require	preventative	management.	The	aim	 is	 to	disrupt	or	 fix	a	potential	 threat	before	 it	
reaches	British	shores,	thereby	quietly	bypassing	constraints	against	overt	intervention	and	
even	preventing	the	responsibility/capability	disconnect	from	arising	in	the	first	place.	It	is	a	
potentially	 virtuous	 circle	 –	 and	 one	which	 appeals	 to	 policymakers.	 Although	 it	may	 yet	
prove	 ambitious,	 this	 was	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 2015	 SDSR	 which	 recognised	 that	




Whilst	 encouraging	 a	 more	 active	 intelligence	 approach,	 the	 diffuse	 and	 elusive	
nature	 of	 these	 threats	 simultaneously	 constrains	 larger	 more	 ambitious	 covert	 actions.	
Historically,	 British	 covert	 action	 focused	 on	 elites:	 on	 kings,	 generals,	 tribal	 chiefs,	 and	
opposition	leaders.	This	is	now	out	of	date.	As	recent	international	events	have	highlighted	
and	 governments	 recognised,	 the	UK	 operates	 in	 a	 networked	world	 in	which	 traditional	
political	authority	carries	less	agency	than	fifty	years	ago.	In	an	era	of	mass	communication,	
social	movements,	and	grassroots	change,	there	are	more	variables	to	control	and	it	 is	 far	
harder	 to	 affect	 manageable	 change.
120




threats	rather	than	 instigate	regime	change	or	engage	 in	 longer	term	activity.	This	applies	
not	only	to	militaristic	special	operations,	but	to	influence	and	technical	operations	too.	





Demonstrating	 the	 interplay	between	 internal	 and	external	 factors,	Whitehall	possesses	a	
climate	conducive	for	using	intelligence	and	Special	Forces	actors	to	shape	events.	Increased	
political	 and	 legal	 scrutiny	 does	 not	 necessarily	 prevent	 operations.	 It	 may	 well	 curtail	














	We	 have	 already	 seen	myriad	 examples	 under	 the	 first	 Cameron	 government,	
including	 in	March	 2011	when	William	Hague,	 as	 Foreign	 Secretary,	 approved	 SIS’s	 initial	








Covert	 action	 is	 permitted	 in	 the	 British	 system;	 and	 scrutiny	 does	 not	 equate	 to	
rejection.	 Most	 British	 covert	 action	 since	 1945	 has	 consistently	 been	 tied	 to	 the	 core	
executive	 –	 at	 the	 strategic	 level	 at	 the	 very	 least.	 Back	 in	 1950,	 Clement	 Attlee	 and	 his	
Foreign	 Secretary,	 Ernest	 Bevin,	 authorised	 a	 pattern	 of	 covert	 action	 behind	 the	 Iron	
Curtain.
125








In	 2010,	 Cameron	 created	 the	 National	 Security	 Council,	 further	 enhancing	 the	
permissive	environment	for	covert	action.	 It	provides	a	mechanism	to	task,	scrutinise,	and	
coordinate	 such	 activity.	 It	 does	 so	 in	 three	ways.	 First,	 the	 NSC	 sits	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	
Whitehall	 intelligence	and	security	world.	 It	drives	the	 intelligence	community’s	work	and,	
symptomatic	 of	 the	 growing	 centrality	 of	 intelligence	 over	 recent	 decades,	 offers	 an	
unparalleled	 interaction	 with	 policy.	 It	 institutionalises	 regular	 contact	 between	 senior	
policymakers	and	the	 intelligence	chiefs,	thereby	naturally	offering	a	useful	framework	for	
the	discussion	of	covert	action.	 Iain	Lobban,	 then	head	of	GCHQ,	believed	 that	 the	NSC	 is	
‘one	of	 the	best	 things	 this	 government	has	done’	 because	 it	 ‘takes	 the	 sentiment	 in	 the	




asked	 to	 disrupt,	 sabotage,	 or	 “fix”	 a	 certain	 problem.
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	 Two	 recent	 examples	 of	 this	
include	 Cameron’s	 instruction	 to	 intelligence	 and	 Special	 Forces	 to	 hunt	 down	 so-called	
“Jihadi	 John”,
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Second,	 there	 is	 historical	 precedent	 for	 this.	 The	 NSC	 machinery	 operates	 in	 a	
similar	way	to	a	string	of	earlier	interdepartmental	committees	tasked	with	scrutinising	and	







order	 to	 do	 so,	 government	 bodies	 constantly	 seek	 to	 remove	 constraints	 on	 their	
performance,	 the	 most	 prominent	 of	 which	 are	 budgetary	 and	 personnel	 cuts.
133
	 It	 is	
entirely	 predictable	 that	 in	 an	 era	 of	 austerity,	 SIS	 would	 appeal	 to	 the	 Prime	Minister’s	
desire	for	action;	especially	when	operating	in	an	environment	where	they	are	regularly	in	












accompanied	 by	 an	 official	 equivalent.	 Importantly,	 policymakers	 and	 intelligence	 chiefs	
debated	 the	 scope	 and	 possibilities	 of	 covert	 action	 around	 the	 NSC	 table.	 It	 provided	 a	
forum	 in	 which	 SIS,	 GCHQ,	 and	 Special	 Forces	 could	 be	 tasked.
136
	 Again	 however,	 it	
promoted	 tactical	 level,	 or	 short	 term,	 covert	 action,	 not	 least	 because	 real-time	





Moreover,	 regarding	 Special	 Forces	 at	 least,	 ‘short-term	 operational	 requirements	 have	
tended	to	trump	more	long-term’	alternatives.	A	more	ambitious	scale	leads	to	an	increase	
in	 personnel	 –	 and	 a	 decrease	 in	 quality.
138
	 This	 inevitably	 prioritises	 the	 disruption	 and	
preventative	operations	outlined	above.	
At	the	same	time,	British	review	and	oversight	mechanisms	are	comparatively	weak.	
The	 ISC	 has	 long	 been	 criticised	 for	 being	 founded	 as	 a	 statutory	 ‘committee	 of	
parliamentarians’	 selected	 by,	 and	 reporting	 to,	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 rather	 than	 a	
parliamentary	committee.	Moreover,	it	traditionally	had	limited	powers	to	acquire	sensitive	
information,	 lacked	adequate	resources,	and	was	 initially	seen	as	overly	deferential	 to	the	
intelligence	agencies.
139




is	 not	 a	 policy.	 It	 is	 a	 means	 of	 executing	 policy.	 The	 2013	 Justice	 and	 Security	 Act	
strengthened	the	ISC	by	increasing	its	remit	over	operational	matters,	strengthening	some	
of	 its	 powers,	 and	 extending	 parliamentary	 control.	 Despite	 this,	 its	 monopoly	 over	
intelligence	 and	 the	 narrowness	 of	 its	 membership	 still	 prevents	 wider	 parliamentary	
scrutiny	and	oversight,	including	by	the	Foreign	Affairs	Select	Committee.	This	may	be	highly	
problematic	 from	 a	 normative	 or	 democratic	 perspective,	 but	 on	 a	 pragmatic	 level	 it	
increases	the	appeal	of	covert	action	to	the	executive.	
Select	committees	still	face	‘very	real	limits	with	regard	to	access	to	information	and	
personnel	 from	 the	 agencies	 and	 from	 government.’
141
	 In	 2014,	 the	 Home	 Affairs	 Select	
Committee	concluded	that	 ‘We	do	not	believe	the	current	system	of	oversight	 is	effective	
and	 we	 have	 concerns	 that	 the	 weak	 nature	 of	 that	 system	 has	 an	 impact	 upon	 the	
credibility	 of	 the	 agencies’	 accountability,	 and	 to	 the	 credibility	 of	 Parliament	 itself.’	MPs	








two	 other	 areas.	 First,	 ISC	 reports	 offer	 little	 discussion	 of	 covert	 action	 beyond	 an	
acknowledgement	 that	 it	 is	undertaken.	 The	only	exception	was	a	brief	paragraph	on	 the	
failure	in	Libya	which	merely	blamed	ministers	for	demanding	quick	action	and	praised	SIS’s	
ability	 to	 learn	 lessons.
143
	 Second,	 the	 Americans	 appreciated	 Britain’s	 weak	 oversight	
system	when	 considering	 the	 UK’s	 value	 in	 the	 “special	 intelligence	 relationship”.
144
	 This	
was,	 as	 the	 Snowden	 documents	 revealed,	 certainly	 the	 case	 regarding	 intelligence	
collection,	but	it	has	also	extended	to	covert	action.	The	CIA	valued	British	assistance	in	the	
covert	support	to	the	Mujahedeen	in	the	1980s	Afghan-Soviet	war,	for	example.	One	reason	
was	 because	 British	 legal	 restrictions	 were	 looser,	 especially	 compared	 to	 the	 post-
Watergate	 climate	 in	 which	 the	 CIA	 operated.
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	 Similarly,	 the	 American	 system	 of	














and	 enables	 such	 covert	 action.	 The	 idea	 of	 a	 global	 role	 remains	 a	 key	 driver	 of	 British	
policy,	 but	 the	 execution	 of	 this	 is	 hamstrung	 by	 economic,	 political,	 and	 military	
constraints.	 This	 creates	 a	 gap	 between	 perceived	 responsibilities	 and	 capabilities;	




designed	 to	 disrupt	 problems	 before	 they	 materialise.	 The	 past	 decade	 has	 witnessed	 a	
growing	 fusion	 between	 intelligence	 and	 Special	 Forces,	 as	well	 as	 intelligence	 personnel	
working	 proactively	 and	 operationally	 in	 their	 own	 right.	 At	 the	 bureaucratic	 level,	 and	
demonstrating	 interplay	between	 internal	and	external	 factors,	 the	domestic	machinery	 is	
conducive	 for	 such	 activity.	 SIS,	 GCHQ	 and	 Special	 Forces	 are	 permitted	 to	 engage	 in	
authorised	operations	overseas,	the	National	Security	Council	presents	a	powerful	forum	in	
which	 to	 task	 intelligence	 agencies,	whilst	 oversight	 is	 comparatively	weak.	 These	 factors	
combined	create	an	atmosphere	permissive	 to	 small	 scale,	 less	provocative	 covert	action,	
including	 disruption	 and	 discrediting	 operations.	 The	 fluidity	 of	 the	 international	
environment	and	greater	scrutiny	act	against	 longer-term	more	ambitious	activity.	 Indeed,	










and	 (theoretically)	 preventing	 future	 threats	 from	 materialising,	 thereby	 preventing	 the	
need	 to	 face	 such	 constraints	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 It	 is	 not	 necessarily	 arguing	 that	 covert	
action	 will	 successfully	 achieve	 this.	 Indeed,	 covert	 action	 is	 a	 risky	 means	 of	 executing	
policy	 and	 involves	 a	 range	 of	 limitations,	 from	 “blowback”	 to	 escalation,	 and	 must	 be	





government	 that	 the	UK	engages	 in	 this	 sort	of	activity	 is	only	a	 first	 step.	There	are	now	
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